Condorelli, Daniele (2013) Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources. Games and Economic Behavior, 82 (C). pp. 582-591. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008
Condorelli, Daniele (2013) Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources. Games and Economic Behavior, 82 (C). pp. 582-591. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008
Condorelli, Daniele (2013) Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources. Games and Economic Behavior, 82 (C). pp. 582-591. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008
Abstract
A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics. I solve for the optimal mechanism. The choice between market or non-market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Non-market mechanisms; Rationing; Mechanism design |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HA Statistics H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Oct 2013 12:14 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 19:54 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8189 |