Bhaskar, V and To, Ted (2002) Is perfect price discrimination really efficient? An analysis of free entry. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester. (Submitted)
Bhaskar, V and To, Ted (2002) Is perfect price discrimination really efficient? An analysis of free entry. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester. (Submitted)
Bhaskar, V and To, Ted (2002) Is perfect price discrimination really efficient? An analysis of free entry. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester. (Submitted)
Abstract
We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. With a fixed number of firms, and in the absence of coordination failures, perfect price discrimination provides incentives for firms to choose product characteristics in a socially optimal way. However, with free entry, the number of firms is always excessive. Our results apply to a large class of models of product differentiation. They also apply to models of common agency or lobbying with free entry and imply that one has excessive entry into the ranks of the principals.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | price discrimination, marginal contributions, free entry, product differentiation, common agency. |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| Depositing User: | Users 161 not found. |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2014 14:59 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Aug 2014 14:59 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8840 |
Available files
Filename: dp537.pdf