Bhaskar, V (2004) Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized Trials in the Game of Cricket. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Bhaskar, V (2004) Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized Trials in the Game of Cricket. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Bhaskar, V (2004) Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized Trials in the Game of Cricket. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Abstract
In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision is assigned via a coin toss. We utilize these “randomized trials” to examine (a) the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences, and (b) the treatment effects of chosen actions. We find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are often poorly made since they reduce the probability of the team winning.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | decision theory, zero sum situation, randomized trial, treatment effects. |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| Depositing User: | Users 161 not found. |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2014 13:52 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Aug 2014 13:52 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8875 |
Available files
Filename: dp578.pdf