Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2013) Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values. UNSPECIFIED. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2013) Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values. UNSPECIFIED. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2013) Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values. UNSPECIFIED. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Abstract
Consider the problem of deciding a winner among three alternatives when voters have common values, but private information regarding the values of the alternatives. We compare approval voting with other scoring rules. For any finite electorate, the best equilibrium under approval voting is more efficient than either plurality rule or negative voting. If any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information in large elections, then approval voting must do so as well.
| Item Type: | Monograph (UNSPECIFIED) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2014 09:33 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Sep 2022 19:18 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8983 |
Available files
Filename: dp732.pdf