Items where Author is "Ventre, Carmine"

Article

Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine (2025) Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms without Money for Scheduling. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics. (In Press)

Ferraioli, Diodato and Ventre, Carmine (2019) Social pressure in opinion dynamics. Theoretical Computer Science, 795. pp. 345-361. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2019.07.017

Ferraioli, Diodato and Ventre, Carmine (2019) Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 15 (2). pp. 1-42. DOI https://doi.org/10.1145/3301315

Conference or Workshop Item

De Keijzer, Bart and Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine (2020) Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions. In: 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020), 2020-07-08 - 2020-07-11, Saarbrücken, Germany [online].

Serafino, P and Ventre, Carmine and Vidali, A (2020) Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring. In: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2019), 2019-05-13 - ?, Montreal. (In Press)

Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine and Zhang, Xiaomeng (2019) Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location. In: Algorithmic Game Theory, 12th International Symposium, SAGT 2019, 2019-09-30 - 2019-10-03, Athens, Greece.

Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine (2019) Obviously strategyproof mechanisms without money for scheduling. In: AAMAS '19: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019-05-13 - 2019-05-17, Montreal QC Canada.

Ferraioli, Diodato and Ventre, Carmine (2018) Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018-07-10 - 2018-07-15, Stockholm.