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Article
Ferraioli, Diodato and Ventre, Carmine (2019) Social pressure in opinion dynamics. Theoretical Computer Science, 795. pp. 345-361. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2019.07.017
Ferraioli, Diodato and Ventre, Carmine (2019) Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 15 (2). pp. 1-42. DOI https://doi.org/10.1145/3301315
Gatti, N and Rocco, M and Serafino, P and Ventre, C (2018) Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. Theoretical Computer Science, 745. pp. 150-162. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2018.06.011
Fotakis, D and Krysta, P and Ventre, C (2018) The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 62. pp. 459-488. DOI https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11215
Ferraioli, D and Goldberg, PW and Ventre, C (2016) Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games. Theoretical Computer Science, 648. pp. 96-115. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2016.08.011
Serafino, P and Ventre, C (2016) Heterogeneous facility location without money. Theoretical Computer Science, 636. pp. 27-46. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2016.04.033
Conference or Workshop Item
De Keijzer, Bart and Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine (2020) Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions. In: 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020), 2020-07-08 - 2020-07-11, Saarbrücken, Germany [online].
Serafino, P and Ventre, Carmine and Vidali, A (2020) Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring. In: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2019), 2019-05-13 - ?, Montreal. (In Press)
Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine and Zhang, Xiaomeng (2019) Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location. In: Algorithmic Game Theory, 12th International Symposium, SAGT 2019, 2019-09-30 - 2019-10-03, Athens, Greece.
Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine (2019) Obviously strategyproof mechanisms without money for scheduling. In: AAMAS '19: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019-05-13 - 2019-05-17, Montreal QC Canada.
Ferraioli, Diodato and Ventre, Carmine (2018) Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018-07-10 - 2018-07-15, Stockholm.
Ferraioli, D and Ventre, C (2017) Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations (extended abstract). In: ICTCS 2017 and CILC 2017 Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science and Italian Conference on Computational Logic, 2017-09-26 - 2017-09-28, Naples.
Ferraioli, D and Ventre, C (2017) Social Pressure in Opinion Games. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17), 2017-08-19 - 2017-08-25, Melbourne.
Ferraioli, D and Ventre, C (2017) Obvious strategyproofness needs monitoring for good approximations. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-17), 2017-02-04 - 2017-02-10, San Francisco.