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Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices

Bose, Subir and Renou, Ludovic (2014) 'Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices.' Econometrica, 82 (5). pp. 1853-1872. ISSN 0012-9682

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Abstract

This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication, can allow (partial) implementation of social choice functions that are not incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. We provide a complete characterization of social choice functions partially implementable by ambiguous mechanisms.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Mechanism design ; ambiguity ; communication device ; multiple priors
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 11 May 2015 10:42
Last Modified: 11 May 2015 10:42
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/13685

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