Renou, Ludovic (2014) Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices. Econometrica, 82 (5). pp. 1853-1872. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285
Renou, Ludovic (2014) Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices. Econometrica, 82 (5). pp. 1853-1872. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285
Renou, Ludovic (2014) Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices. Econometrica, 82 (5). pp. 1853-1872. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285
Abstract
This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication, can allow (partial) implementation of social choice functions that are not incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. We provide a complete characterization of social choice functions partially implementable by ambiguous mechanisms.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Mechanism design ; ambiguity ; communication device ; multiple priors |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 11 May 2015 10:42 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Oct 2024 13:46 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/13685 |
Available files
Filename: Bose_Renou.pdf