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An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games

Ramalingam, Abhijit and Godoy, Sara and Morales, Antonio J and Walker, James M (2014) An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games. Working Paper. University of Essex, EssexLab. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose unilaterally whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves the “right” to punish can do so. We find that the effectiveness of the institution may not require provision of the institution at the level of the group. Individuals acting unilaterally are able to provide sanctioning institutions that effectively raise cooperation. The effectiveness of the institution, however, depends on whether the “right” to sanction entails a monetary cost or not.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Additional Information: See also University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) Working Paper series, http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/ueawcbess/14-10.htm
Uncontrolled Keywords: public goods, experiment, punishment, institution formation, unilateral provision, cooperation
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 01 Feb 2016 10:41
Last Modified: 01 Feb 2016 10:41
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/16007

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