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Common value elections with private information and informative priors: Theory and experiments

Mengel, F and Rivas, J (2017) 'Common value elections with private information and informative priors: Theory and experiments.' Games and Economic Behavior, 104. 190 - 221. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

© 2017 Elsevier Inc. We study efficiency and information aggregation in common value elections with contin-uous private signals and informative priors. We show that small elections are not generally efficient and that there are equilibria where some voters vote against their private signal even if it provides useful information and abstention is allowed. This is not the case in large elections, where the fraction of voters who vote against their private signal tends to zero. In an experiment, we then study how informativeness of priors and private signals impact efficiency and information aggregation in small elections. We find that there is a substantial amount of voting against the private signal. Moreover, while most experimental elections are efficient, we find that it is not generally the case that better private information leads to better decisions.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Friederike Mengel
Date Deposited: 19 Apr 2017 09:56
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 16:20
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/19438

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