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Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes, and Consequences

Martin, SG and Mickler, TA (2019) 'Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes, and Consequences.' Parliamentary Affairs, 72 (1). 77 - 98. ISSN 0031-2290

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that a strong legislature is built on a strong internal committee system, both in terms of committee powers and the willingness of members to engage in committee work. Committee assignments are the behavioural manifestation of legislative organisation. Despite this, much remains unknown about how committee assignments happen and with what causes and consequences. Our focus in this article is on providing the context for, and introducing new research on, what we call the political economy of committee assignments - which members get selected to sit on which committees, why, and with what consequences.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 21 Feb 2018 10:47
Last Modified: 08 Apr 2019 12:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/21328

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