Martin, SG and Mickler, TA (2019) Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes, and Consequences. Parliamentary Affairs, 72 (1). pp. 77-98. DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsy015
Martin, SG and Mickler, TA (2019) Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes, and Consequences. Parliamentary Affairs, 72 (1). pp. 77-98. DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsy015
Martin, SG and Mickler, TA (2019) Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes, and Consequences. Parliamentary Affairs, 72 (1). pp. 77-98. DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsy015
Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that a strong legislature is built on a strong internal committee system, both in terms of committee powers and the willingness of members to engage in committee work. Committee assignments are the behavioural manifestation of legislative organisation. Despite this, much remains unknown about how committee assignments happen and with what causes and consequences. Our focus in this article is on providing the context for, and introducing new research on, what we call the political economy of committee assignments - which members get selected to sit on which committees, why, and with what consequences.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 21 Feb 2018 10:47 |
Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2022 13:47 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/21328 |
Available files
Filename: Martin and Mickler 2018.pdf