Research Repository

Imitation and the Role of Information in Overcoming Coordination Failures

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon Imitation and the Role of Information in Overcoming Coordination Failures. UNSPECIFIED. UNSPECIFIED.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We model the structure of a firm or an organization as a network and consider minimum-effort games played on this network as a metaphor for cooperations failing due to coordination failures. For a family of behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. However, in the presence of informational spillovers, a minimal condition on the network guarantees that efficient conventions will eventually dominate. An analogous result is established for average opinion games.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled Keywords: C72, D83
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 27 Jun 2012 15:12
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 18:12
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2627

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item