Al贸s-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon Imitation and the Role of Information in Overcoming Coordination Failures. UNSPECIFIED. UNSPECIFIED.
Al贸s-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon Imitation and the Role of Information in Overcoming Coordination Failures. UNSPECIFIED. UNSPECIFIED.
Al贸s-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon Imitation and the Role of Information in Overcoming Coordination Failures. UNSPECIFIED. UNSPECIFIED.
Abstract
We model the structure of a firm or an organization as a network and consider minimum-effort games played on this network as a metaphor for cooperations failing due to coordination failures. For a family of behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. However, in the presence of informational spillovers, a minimal condition on the network guarantees that efficient conventions will eventually dominate. An analogous result is established for average opinion games.
Item Type: | Monograph (UNSPECIFIED) |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | C72; D83 |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2012 15:12 |
Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2022 00:40 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2627 |