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Job Search with Bidder Memories

Carrillo-Tudela, C and Menzio, G and Smith, E (2009) Job Search with Bidder Memories. UNSPECIFIED. Penn Institute for Economic Research, PIER Working Paper Archive, 09-027.

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Abstract

This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers, in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding, have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Job search; recall; wage determination; Diamond paradox
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2012 11:04
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 18:12
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2669

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