Carrillo-Tudela, C and Menzio, G and Smith, E (2009) Job Search with Bidder Memories. UNSPECIFIED. Penn Institute for Economic Research, PIER Working Paper Archive, 09-027.
Carrillo-Tudela, C and Menzio, G and Smith, E (2009) Job Search with Bidder Memories. UNSPECIFIED. Penn Institute for Economic Research, PIER Working Paper Archive, 09-027.
Carrillo-Tudela, C and Menzio, G and Smith, E (2009) Job Search with Bidder Memories. UNSPECIFIED. Penn Institute for Economic Research, PIER Working Paper Archive, 09-027.
Abstract
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers, in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding, have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.
Item Type: | Monograph (UNSPECIFIED) |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Job search; recall; wage determination; Diamond paradox |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 03 Jul 2012 11:04 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 18:37 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2669 |