Grimm, Veronika and Mengel, Friederike (2011) 'Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games.' Economics Letters, 111 (2). pp. 113-115. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

Delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance of low offers. While in treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, 60-80% are accepted as we delay the acceptance decision by around 10. min. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Ultimatum Bargaining; Experiments
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor:	Elements
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	07 Mar 2013 11:49
Last Modified:	15 Jan 2022 00:48
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5770

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