Using freedom of information laws to frustrate accountability: Two case studies of UK banking frauds

Accountability is considered to be central to the functioning of a democratic and informed society. A large volume of literature theorises accountability and explains how it should be and could be deepened. There is a general view that the availability of state held information can enhance possibilities of citizen participation and democratic governance, and check unethical and corrupt behaviour by state and corporate elites. The state held documents can arguably enable citizens to construct a richer account of corporate frauds, accounting/auditing scandals and regulatory failures and call policymakers to account. The neoliberal state has managed the tensions between the public demands for information and the tendency to protect elites from public scrutiny by regularising the flow of information via freedom of information laws. Such laws hold out the possibility of greater information, but also give state officials plenty of discretion to frustrate unwelcome requests. The issues are explored through two case studies relating to banking frauds in the UK. The cases highlight the dynamics of calling the state to account through the freedom of information laws and show that the state apparatus goes to considerable lengths to shield elites from public scrutiny.