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Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game

Argenziano, Rossella and Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp (2013) 'Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game.' Economics Letters, 120 (3). pp. 509-512. ISSN 0165-1765

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We show that in a preemption game of entry into a Cournot market, increasing the number of competitors beyond duopoly does not bring forward the time of first entry. We also show that all entries, except the first one, occur earlier than socially optimal.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Timing games; Preemption; Dynamic entry
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 06 Nov 2013 19:35
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2022 00:20

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