Argenziano, Rossella and Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp (2013) Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game. Economics Letters, 120 (3). pp. 509-512. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.009
Argenziano, Rossella and Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp (2013) Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game. Economics Letters, 120 (3). pp. 509-512. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.009
Argenziano, Rossella and Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp (2013) Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game. Economics Letters, 120 (3). pp. 509-512. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.009
Abstract
We show that in a preemption game of entry into a Cournot market, increasing the number of competitors beyond duopoly does not bring forward the time of first entry. We also show that all entries, except the first one, occur earlier than socially optimal.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Timing games; Preemption; Dynamic entry |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Nov 2013 19:35 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Aug 2022 11:04 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8272 |