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The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem

Ahn, David S and Oliveros, Santiago (2013) The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economic Discussion Papers, Colchester.

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Abstract

Should two issues be decided jointly by a single committee or in separately by different committees? Similarly, should two defendants be tried together in a joint trial or tried separately in severed trials? Multiplicity of issues or defendants introduces novel strategic considerations. As in the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, we consider large committees with common values and incomplete information. Our main result is that the joint trial by a single committee can aggregate information if and only if the severed trials by separate committees can aggregate information. Specifically, suppose that either for the joint trial or for the severed trials there exists an sequence of equilibria that implements the optimal outcome with probability approaching one as the number of voters goes to infinity. Then a sequence of equilibria with similar asymptotic efficiency exists for the other format. Thus, the advantage of either format cannot hinge on pure information aggregation with many signals.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 04 Apr 2014 15:12
Last Modified: 16 Dec 2014 11:14
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/9011

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