Juarez-Luna, David and Ghiglino, Christian (2014) Elite capture of democratic politics: The role of social identity. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Juarez-Luna, David and Ghiglino, Christian (2014) Elite capture of democratic politics: The role of social identity. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Juarez-Luna, David and Ghiglino, Christian (2014) Elite capture of democratic politics: The role of social identity. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Abstract
In the present paper we uncover a novel mechanism through which a minority can gain a disproportionate power in a perfectly functioning democracy, decides on a unique redistributive instrument, the tax rate. We show that a minority characterised by a high degree of social identification may, in the presence of ideological motives, influence the policy outcome. In particular, a rise in social identification among the rich minority may be able to reduce the tax rate. Importantly, this may happen even if the minority is more ideological than the majority. Finally, we attempt an explanation of the divide in the tax rate between the US and Europe.
Item Type: | ["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined] |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | HB; |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2014 18:53 |
Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2022 00:40 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10011 |
Available files
Filename: dp751.pdf