The political context of issue-priority voting: coalitions and economic voting in the Netherlands, 1970–1999

Issue-priority models are the principal alternatives to reward-punishment or incumbency-oriented models of the political economy of party support. A focus on the political context clarifies some conceptual difficulties with issue-priority voting. We emphasize the implications of multi-party system and coalition government. A case study is presented on how economic factors have affected party popularity in the Netherlands between 1970 and 1999. Coalitions have not rendered issue-priority voting infeasible because (1) voters possess necessary basic information, (2) they have indentifiable perceptions about party issue priority, and (3) they have reasonable expectations about the relation between electoral outcomes and possible coalitions. Survey data and time-series analyses provide support for the idea that issue-priority voting is conditional on perceptions of competency and coalition structure. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.