Al贸s-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2014) Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures. Games and Economic Behavior, 87 (C). pp. 397-411. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.013
Al贸s-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2014) Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures. Games and Economic Behavior, 87 (C). pp. 397-411. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.013
Al贸s-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2014) Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures. Games and Economic Behavior, 87 (C). pp. 397-411. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.013
Abstract
We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. In the presence of information spillovers, we provide a condition on the network structure that guarantees the emergence of efficient conventions. In contrast, if this condition is violated we will observe inefficient conventions, even in the presence of information spillovers.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Minimum effort games; Local interactions; Learning; Imitation |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 14 Jan 2015 15:47 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 20:22 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/12317 |