Kellner, Christian and Reinstein, David and Riener, Gerhard and Sanders, Michael (2015) Giving and Probability. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Kellner, Christian and Reinstein, David and Riener, Gerhard and Sanders, Michael (2015) Giving and Probability. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Kellner, Christian and Reinstein, David and Riener, Gerhard and Sanders, Michael (2015) Giving and Probability. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Abstract
When and how should a fundraiser ask for a donation from an individual facing an uncertain bonus income? A standard model of expected utility over outcomes predicts that the individual’s before choice – her ex-ante commitment conditional on her income – will be the same as her choice after the income has been revealed. Deciding “if you win, how much will you donate?” involves a commitment (i) over a donation for a state of the world that may not be realized and (ii) over uncertain income. Models involving reference-dependent utility, tangibility, and self-signaling predict more giving before, while theories of affect predict more giving after. In our online field experiment at a UK university, as well as in our laboratory experiments in Germany, charitable giving was significantly larger in the Before treatment than in the After treatment for male subjects, with a significant gender differential. Lab treatments isolated distinct mechanisms: for men, donations were higher in all treatments where the donation’s collection was uncertain, whether or not the income was known. This supports a (self)-signaling explanation: commitments realized with a lower probability must involve larger amounts to have the same signaling power. Our results are directly relevant to fundraising and volunteer-recruitment strategies,and offer further evidence that we need to exercise caution in applying expected-utility theory in the presence of social preferences.
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
Depositing User: | Jim Jamieson |
Date Deposited: | 15 May 2015 15:09 |
Last Modified: | 15 May 2015 15:09 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/13794 |
Available files
Filename: dp762.pdf