The Existential Sources of Phenomenology: Heidegger on Formal Indication

This article contributes to the contemporary debate regarding the young Heidegger's method of formal indication. Theodore Kisiel argues that this method constitutes a radical break with Husserl?a rejection of phenomenological reflection that paves the way to the non-reflective approach of the Beitr�ge. Against this view, Steven Crowell argues that formal indication is continuous with Husserlian phenomenology?a refinement of phenomenological reflection that reveals its existential sources. I evaluate this debate and adduce further considerations in favor of Crowell's view. To do so, I analyze the young Heidegger's account of phenomenological communication and argue that it further reflects the continuity that Crowell identifies: as he does with reflection, Heidegger refines Husserl's account of phenomenological communication and sheds light on its existential sources.