Death and Deliberation: Overcoming the Decisionism Critique of Heidegger's Practical Philosophy

This paper defends Heidegger?s account of resolute self-choice against the ubiquitous Decisionism Critique [DC]. According to DC, Heidegger?s discussion of resoluteness commits him to an indefensible position in which resolute Dasein is said to choose who it will be without recourse to any reasons or evaluative standards. In response, I argue that DC is based on a misunderstanding of some of the key arguments of Being and Time. I then offer an alternative portrait of Heidegger?s account of resolute self-choice and argue that such choice will involve both 1) the consideration of factical claims as reasons that count in favor of a particular way of life and 2) the evaluation of these reasons in light of at least three deliberative standards. Thus, I argue that DC is misguided and needs to be replaced by an interpretation rooted in a more complete understanding of Heidegger?s project.