Bohmelt, Tobias and Escribà Folch, Abel and Pilster, Ulrich (2019) Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (5). pp. 1111-1139. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/F0022002718789744
Bohmelt, Tobias and Escribà Folch, Abel and Pilster, Ulrich (2019) Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (5). pp. 1111-1139. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/F0022002718789744
Bohmelt, Tobias and Escribà Folch, Abel and Pilster, Ulrich (2019) Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63 (5). pp. 1111-1139. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/F0022002718789744
Abstract
Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establish networks among military officers that may facilitate coordination necessary for plotting a putsch. We also contend and empirically demonstrate that these negative side effects of military academies are in particular pronounced in nondemocracies, that is, military academies have diverse effects across regime types. This work has significant implications for our understanding civil–military relations. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on military education and professionalization, as we suggest that military academies are important vehicles through which coups can emerge predominantly in authoritarian states.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | civil–military relations, coup d’état, military academy, military professionalism |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 05 Sep 2018 12:56 |
Last Modified: | 23 Sep 2022 19:24 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22314 |
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