Embrey, M and Mengel, F and Peeters, R (2018) Strategy revision opportunities and collusion. Experimental Economics. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5
Embrey, M and Mengel, F and Peeters, R (2018) Strategy revision opportunities and collusion. Experimental Economics. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5
Embrey, M and Mengel, F and Peeters, R (2018) Strategy revision opportunities and collusion. Experimental Economics. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9580-5
Abstract
This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Strategy revision opportunities; Cooperation; Repeated games; Complements versus substitutes |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Jul 2018 12:24 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Sep 2022 19:25 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22687 |
Available files
Filename: Embrey2018_Article_StrategyRevisionOpportunitiesA.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0