Parr, Tom and Slavny, Adam (2019) What's Wrong with Risk? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 8 (2). pp. 76-85. DOI https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.407
Parr, Tom and Slavny, Adam (2019) What's Wrong with Risk? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 8 (2). pp. 76-85. DOI https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.407
Parr, Tom and Slavny, Adam (2019) What's Wrong with Risk? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 8 (2). pp. 76-85. DOI https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.407
Abstract
Imposing pure risks – risks that do not materialise into harm – is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account explains this wrongness by claiming that pure risks are harms. By contrast, The Autonomy Account claims that pure risks impede autonomy. We develop two objections to these influential accounts. The Separation Objection proceeds from the observation that, if it is wrong to v then it is sometimes wrong to risk v-ing. The intuitive plausibility of this claim does not depend on any account of the facts that ground moral wrongness. This suggests a close relationship between the factors that make an act wrong and the factors that make risking that act wrong, which both accounts fail to recognise. The Determinism Objection holds that both accounts fail to explain the wrongness of pure risks in a deterministic world. We then develop an alternative – The Buck-Passing Account – that withstands both objections.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | pure risks; John Oberdiek; harm; autonomy; intentions |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 25 Apr 2019 15:01 |
Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2022 13:56 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/23755 |
Available files
Filename: What's Wrong with Risk.pdf