Garriga, Ana Carolina and Meseguer, Covadonga (2019) Remittances, Monetary Institutions, and Autocracies. Oxford Development Studies, 47 (4). pp. 452-467. DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2019.1649382
Garriga, Ana Carolina and Meseguer, Covadonga (2019) Remittances, Monetary Institutions, and Autocracies. Oxford Development Studies, 47 (4). pp. 452-467. DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2019.1649382
Garriga, Ana Carolina and Meseguer, Covadonga (2019) Remittances, Monetary Institutions, and Autocracies. Oxford Development Studies, 47 (4). pp. 452-467. DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2019.1649382
Abstract
How do remittances affect the choice of exchange rate regimes? Previous research shows that remittances, by easing the ‘impossible trinity’, increase the probability of governments adopting fixed exchange rates. However, that research overlooks the conditioning effect of monetary and political institutions. We argue that remittances, by altering recipient governments’ incentives to use monetary policy counter-cyclically, make central bank independence a credible anti-inflationary tool in less credible regimes; that is, autocracies. Thus, autocracies that receive remittances do not need to rely on fixed exchange rates. In this way, remittances open policy alternatives for developing autocracies. Statistical tests on a sample of 87 developing and transitional countries between 1980 and 2010 support our argument.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Remittances; Central bank independence; Exchange rate regimes; Autocracies; Developing countries |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 05 Aug 2019 14:54 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 19:54 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/25109 |
Available files
Filename: Accepted version.pdf