Weidenholzer, Simon Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Weidenholzer, Simon Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Weidenholzer, Simon Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Abstract
The present note revisits a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that any strict Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as a long run equilibrium by properly adding dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions the selection of 1/2 -dominant strategies remains when adding strictly dominated strategies if interaction is decentral". Conversely, if the local interaction structure is central" by adding properly suited dominated strategies any equilibrium strategy of the original game can be supported as long run equilibrium. Classification- JEL: C72, D83
Item Type: | ["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined] |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2012 15:12 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 16:58 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2631 |