Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2008) Contagion and efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory, 143 (1). pp. 251-274. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.003
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2008) Contagion and efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory, 143 (1). pp. 251-274. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.003
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2008) Contagion and efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory, 143 (1). pp. 251-274. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.003
Abstract
We consider a population of agents, either finite or countably infinite, located on an arbitrary network. Agents interact directly only with their immediate neighbors, but are able to observe the behavior of (some) other agents beyond their interaction neighborhood, and learn from that behavior by imitating successful actions. If interactions are not "too global" but information is fluid enough, we show that the efficient action is the only one which can spread contagiously to the whole population from an initially small, finite subgroup. This result holds even in the presence of an alternative, frac(1, 2)-dominant action. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Local interaction games; Learning; Imitation |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2012 15:11 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 20:41 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2634 |