Apesteguia, Jose and Huck, Steffen and Oechssler, Jörg and Weidenholzer, Simon (2007) Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Apesteguia, Jose and Huck, Steffen and Oechssler, Jörg and Weidenholzer, Simon (2007) Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Apesteguia, Jose and Huck, Steffen and Oechssler, Jörg and Weidenholzer, Simon (2007) Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Abstract
A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior.
Item Type: | ["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined] |
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Additional Information: | Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2012 15:10 |
Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2022 00:40 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2640 |