Kalliris, Konstantinos (2017) Self-Authorship, Well-being and Paternalism. Jurisprudence, 8 (1). pp. 23-51. DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2015.1116200
Kalliris, Konstantinos (2017) Self-Authorship, Well-being and Paternalism. Jurisprudence, 8 (1). pp. 23-51. DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2015.1116200
Kalliris, Konstantinos (2017) Self-Authorship, Well-being and Paternalism. Jurisprudence, 8 (1). pp. 23-51. DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2015.1116200
Abstract
Paternalism is the restriction of a person's autonomy for the good of that person. It embodies a familiar conflict of intuitions: while we cherish individual freedom, we also want to protect/promote what we know to be good. So, every paternalist must meet two challenges: paternalism must be justifiable as a restriction of autonomy as well as effective in terms of well-being. In this essay, I argue that the ‘autonomy’ restricted by paternalism is a Razian brand of free self-authorship and that the ‘good’ protected is captured by Martha Nussbaum's account of personal well-being. I then defend a mild welfare paternalism based on a dichotomy implicit in any defensible description of well-being. I argue that some aspects of the good life do not require endorsement and, therefore, can be justifiably and effectively promoted by autonomy-restricting means. Finally, I discuss why paternalism need not be hostile to ethical independence.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | paternalism, autonomy, self-authorship, well-being |
Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Essex Law School |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 25 Jun 2020 10:31 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 21:19 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/26707 |
Available files
Filename: Self-authorshipwell-beingandpaternalism-Final.pdf