Carrillo-Tudela, C and Kaas, L (2011) Wage Dispersion and Labor Turnover with Adverse Selection. UNSPECIFIED. CESifo Group Munich, CESifo Working Paper Series, 3562.
Carrillo-Tudela, C and Kaas, L (2011) Wage Dispersion and Labor Turnover with Adverse Selection. UNSPECIFIED. CESifo Group Munich, CESifo Working Paper Series, 3562.
Carrillo-Tudela, C and Kaas, L (2011) Wage Dispersion and Labor Turnover with Adverse Selection. UNSPECIFIED. CESifo Group Munich, CESifo Working Paper Series, 3562.
Abstract
We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts designed to retain high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have higher turnover rates, they are more often employed in low-wage firms and face an earnings distribution with a higher frictional component. Furthermore, positive sorting obtains in equilibrium.
Item Type: | Monograph (UNSPECIFIED) |
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Additional Information: | Source info: IZA Discussion Paper No. 5936 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | adverse selection; on-the-job search; wage dispersion; sorting |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 03 Jul 2012 14:52 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 18:37 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2742 |