Park, Ju Yeon (2019) Punishing without rewards? A comprehensive examination of the asymmetry in economic voting. Electoral Studies, 57. pp. 1-18. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.10.003
Park, Ju Yeon (2019) Punishing without rewards? A comprehensive examination of the asymmetry in economic voting. Electoral Studies, 57. pp. 1-18. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.10.003
Park, Ju Yeon (2019) Punishing without rewards? A comprehensive examination of the asymmetry in economic voting. Electoral Studies, 57. pp. 1-18. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.10.003
Abstract
It has been controversial whether incumbents are punished more for a bad economy than they are rewarded for a good economy due to mixed results from previous studies on one or handful number of countries. This paper makes an empirical contribution to this lingering question by conducting extensive tests on whether this asymmetry hypothesis is a cross-nationally generalizable phenomenon using all currently available modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey from 122 elections in 42 representative democracies between 1996 and 2016, as well as macro-economic indicators and individual-level economic perception. In general, this paper finds little support for the asymmetry hypothesis; although the evidence of such asymmetric economic voting is found in some subpopulations using certain economic indicators, these conditional effects are largely inconsistent, suggesting that it is still safe to assume a linear relationship between economic conditions and support for the incumbent.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Economic voting; Grievance asymmetry; Negativity effect; Economic perception |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 17 Jun 2020 15:53 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 17:16 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/27767 |
Available files
Filename: Manuscript_revised2.pdf