Is Hope a Secular Virtue? Hope as the Virtue of the Possible

This chapter critically examines the case against hope as a secular virtue, which is based on three main claims: hope is not good for its possessor; it does not stand between two vices; and it cannot be cultivated and exercised. Each of these claims is rejected, so that hope is treated as a virtue after all. In response to the first claim, a distinction is drawn between hope and unwarranted optimism, so that the abilities of the skilled hoper mean that they will avoid the damaging gullibility that Plato and others have associated with hope. In response to the second claim, it is argued that hope stands between the vices of unwarranted optimism and despair. Finally, against the third claim, it is argued that while hope is not a matter of direct or indirect control, it is a matter of aspirational control that is neither active nor passive, but medio-passive.