FRANKEL, JA and ROCKETT, KE (1988) INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION WHEN POLICYMAKERS DO NOT AGREE ON THE TRUE MODEL. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 78 (3). pp. 318-340.
FRANKEL, JA and ROCKETT, KE (1988) INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION WHEN POLICYMAKERS DO NOT AGREE ON THE TRUE MODEL. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 78 (3). pp. 318-340.
FRANKEL, JA and ROCKETT, KE (1988) INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION WHEN POLICYMAKERS DO NOT AGREE ON THE TRUE MODEL. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 78 (3). pp. 318-340.
Abstract
The authors relax the assumption of the literature on international coordination that policymakers know the true model. T wo countries will still be able to agree on a cooperative policy pack age that each believes will improve the objective function relative t o the Nash noncooperative solution. However, the bargaining solution may move the target variables in the wrong direction. These points ar e illustrated with monetary and fiscal multipliers taken from simulat ions of ten leading econometric models. Out of 1,000 possible combina tions of models that could represent U.S. beliefs, non-U.S. beliefs, and the true model, monetary coordination improves U.S. welfare in on ly 546 cases. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 12 Jul 2012 11:43 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 17:09 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2843 |