The Commission’s Evaluation of the Financial Executives’ Remuneration Policy and the Amendments of Directive No 2019/878

the Commission evaluation of EU policies has become an important practice for the review of EU rules. this article is a case study of the 2016 evaluation of the remu- neration rules applicable to financial executives (Directive No 2013/36 – CRD IV), which led to their amendments made by directive 2019/878. these amendments have been negligible and despite the efforts of private interest groups operating in the financial sector, the so-called bonus cap has been maintained. this article explores the dynamics amongst the actors involved in the evaluation of the remuneration policy (Commission, European Banking Authority, and stake- holders) and provides an account of the factors that shaped such evaluation. this paper argues that the influence of private interest groups was limited. Although the bonus cap is a contested policy, and the evidence of its impact ambiguous, it still enjoys legitimacy.