Cui, Zhiwei and Weidenholzer, Simon (2021) Lock-in through passive connections. Journal of Economic Theory, 192. p. 105187. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105187
Cui, Zhiwei and Weidenholzer, Simon (2021) Lock-in through passive connections. Journal of Economic Theory, 192. p. 105187. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105187
Cui, Zhiwei and Weidenholzer, Simon (2021) Lock-in through passive connections. Journal of Economic Theory, 192. p. 105187. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105187
Abstract
We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We study the role of passive connections; these are links that other agents form to a given agent. Such passive connections may create an endogenously arising form of lock-in where agents don’t switch actions and links, as this may result in a loss of payoff received through them. When agents are constrained in the number of links they form, the set of Nash equilibria includes actionheterogenous strategy profiles, where different agents choose different actions. Depending on the precise parameters of the model, risk-dominant, payoff-dominant, or action-heterogenous strategy profiles are stochastically stable.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Social Coordination, Network Formation, Learning, Lock-In |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 04 Jan 2021 13:33 |
Last Modified: | 12 Jul 2022 01:00 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/29463 |
Available files
Filename: CW-20201124_REVISION2.pdf