Galeotti, Andrea and Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2013) Strategic information transmission networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (5). pp. 1751-1769. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.016
Galeotti, Andrea and Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2013) Strategic information transmission networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (5). pp. 1751-1769. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.016
Galeotti, Andrea and Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2013) Strategic information transmission networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (5). pp. 1751-1769. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.016
Abstract
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each others' actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare depends not only on the number of truthful messages sent in equilibrium, but also on how evenly truthful messages are distributed across decision makers. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Cheap talk; Multi-agent communication; Networks; Organizations; Strategic communication |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2012 14:46 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 19:53 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2974 |
Available files
Filename: dp668.pdf