Martin, Wayne (2009) Ought but Cannot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109 (1pt2). pp. 103-128. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00260.x
Martin, Wayne (2009) Ought but Cannot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109 (1pt2). pp. 103-128. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00260.x
Martin, Wayne (2009) Ought but Cannot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109 (1pt2). pp. 103-128. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00260.x
Abstract
I assess a series of arguments intended to show that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Two are rooted in uses of ‘ought’ in contexts of deliberation and command. A third draws on the distinctive resources of deontic logic. I show that, in each case, the arguments leave scope for forms of infinite moral consciousness—forms of moral consciousness in which a moral obligation retains its authority even in the face of the conviction that the obligation is impossible to fulfil. In this respect the paper sides with Martin Luther against Erasmus and Kant.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy and Art History, School of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 14 Sep 2021 12:42 |
Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2022 13:26 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/31087 |