Patel, Aseem and Tan, Joanne and Dalvit, Nicolò (2022) Intra-firm hierarchies and gender gaps. Labour Economics, 77. p. 102029. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2021.102029
Patel, Aseem and Tan, Joanne and Dalvit, Nicolò (2022) Intra-firm hierarchies and gender gaps. Labour Economics, 77. p. 102029. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2021.102029
Patel, Aseem and Tan, Joanne and Dalvit, Nicolò (2022) Intra-firm hierarchies and gender gaps. Labour Economics, 77. p. 102029. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2021.102029
Abstract
We study how changes in female representation at the top of a firm’s organisation affect gender-specific outcomes across hierarchies within firms. We start by developing a theoretical model of a hierarchical firm, where gender representation in top organisational layers can affect gender-specific hiring and promotion probabilities at lower layers. We then exploit a recent French reform that imposed gender representation quotas in the boards of directors and test the model’s predictions in the data. Our empirical results show that the reform was successful in reducing gender wage and representation gaps at the upper layers of the firm, but not at lower firm layers. A Panel VAR analysis confirms that the trickle-down effects of this policy were limited and suggests that quotas targeting middle management, rather than corporate boards, may have a more widespread effect across the firm.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Gender gap; Firm organisation; Gender quota; Trickle-down effect |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 30 Sep 2021 11:42 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 20:48 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/31195 |
Available files
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Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0