Garrett, Daniel (2021) Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting. Theoretical Economics, 16 (4). pp. 1281-1312. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/te4293
Garrett, Daniel (2021) Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting. Theoretical Economics, 16 (4). pp. 1281-1312. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/te4293
Garrett, Daniel (2021) Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting. Theoretical Economics, 16 (4). pp. 1281-1312. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/te4293
Abstract
In the context of a canonical agency mo del, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimally-structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the principal's expected benefit from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predictions can be made robustly given ignorance of a key primitive.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | asymmetric information; mechanism design; robustness; pro curement |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2021 11:55 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 16:35 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/31510 |
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