Garrett, Daniel (2023) Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival. Games and Economic Behavior, 138. pp. 161-170. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007
Garrett, Daniel (2023) Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival. Games and Economic Behavior, 138. pp. 161-170. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007
Garrett, Daniel (2023) Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival. Games and Economic Behavior, 138. pp. 161-170. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007
Abstract
This paper studies the design of efficient mechanisms for repeated bilateral trade in settings where (i) traders’ values and costs evolve randomly with time, and (ii) the traders become ready and available to participate in the mechanism at random times. Under a weak condition, analogous to the non-overlapping supports condition of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), efficient trade is only feasible if the mechanism runs an expected budget deficit. The smallest such deficit is attainable by a sequence of static mechanisms.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | budget balance; dynamic arrivals; dynamic mechanism design; participation constraints; repeated trade |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 25 Jan 2023 21:03 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 20:55 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/34412 |
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