Symeonidis, George (2008) <scp>Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare</scp>. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17 (1). pp. 247-270. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00177.x
Symeonidis, George (2008) <scp>Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare</scp>. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17 (1). pp. 247-270. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00177.x
Symeonidis, George (2008) <scp>Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare</scp>. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17 (1). pp. 247-270. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00177.x
Abstract
<jats:p> <jats:italic>I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two‐part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.</jats:italic> </jats:p>
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 16 Aug 2012 10:27 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 16:49 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/3683 |