Jütten, Timo (2025) The Market Antinomy. Philosophy and Social Criticism. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537251349123
Jütten, Timo (2025) The Market Antinomy. Philosophy and Social Criticism. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537251349123
Jütten, Timo (2025) The Market Antinomy. Philosophy and Social Criticism. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537251349123
Abstract
The moral status of the modern market economy is contested amongst philosophers and social theorists. Some argue that it is a moral order; others argue that it is not a moral order. In Frankfurt School critical theory, the former argument is defended by Axel Honneth, and the latter by Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Heath. In this paper, I review the strengths and weaknesses of both arguments and suggest a novel way forward. I conceive of the contradictory arguments as thesis and antithesis of an antinomy akin to Kant’s antinomy of freedom and determinism in the Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that valuable insights can be gained by “remaining within” the space of the antinomy and considering it the result of a genuine contradictory experience: we do conceive the market economy as a moral order and as not a moral order, depending on the standpoint we take. However, in the final section of the paper, I argue that a resolution of the antinomy is possible, and that we must attend to people’s reactive attitudes to market processes and outcomes to find it.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Antinomy; Axel Honneth; Jürgen Habermas; Moral status of markets; Reactive Attitudes |
Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Philosophical, Historical and Interdisciplinary Studies, School of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 16 Jun 2025 09:46 |
Last Modified: | 16 Jun 2025 09:47 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/40977 |
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