Modes of Liability for AI-Enabled Crimes in International Criminal Law

As artificial intelligence (AI) technologies become increasingly embedded in human activity, the question of individual accountability for AI-enabled international crimes grows more pressing. This article examines how established doctrines of individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law—particularly the modes of liability recognized in the Statute of the International Criminal Court and in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals—may be applied to human actors who interact with AI systems in the commission of core international crimes. Through four hypothetical scenarios, the article explores varying forms of human involvement—from programming to deployment—and assesses whether existing modes of liability, such as perpetration, instigation, aiding and abetting, and superior responsibility, are fit for purpose. The analysis suggests that, in part, the current international legal framework is capable of addressing AI-enabled crimes. However, it also highlights the limitations of these frameworks when applied to highly autonomous or unpredictable AI systems. Where doctrinal tools fall short—particularly in attributing mens rea or establishing control—new legal paradigms may need to be developed.