Coles, Melvyn G and Wright, Randall (1998) A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money. Journal of Economic Theory, 78 (1). pp. 32-54. DOI https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2353
Coles, Melvyn G and Wright, Randall (1998) A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money. Journal of Economic Theory, 78 (1). pp. 32-54. DOI https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2353
Coles, Melvyn G and Wright, Randall (1998) A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money. Journal of Economic Theory, 78 (1). pp. 32-54. DOI https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2353
Abstract
This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching, strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78, D83, E31. © 1998 Academic Press.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Jan 2013 12:48 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Aug 2022 10:54 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4893 |